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NOTES
THE EFFECT OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION ON HOUSING
I. introduction
Effective attainment of a "decent home and a suitable living environment
for every American family"' has proved elusive.
The continuing population explosion threatens to overwhelm the na-
tional inventory of housing. Housing codes, urban renewal programs, and
public housing projects have not yet sufficed to put every American family
in a home that meets minimal standards. Instead, despite our efforts, we
seem in some respects to be falling farther behind in attaining the goal of
adequate housing for everyone.2
The National Commission on Urban Problems was appointed by President
Johnson early in 1967 to study the causes of this mounting housing problem
and to make specific recommendations for change.' Part of this study was
directed to "Federal, State, and local tax policies with respect to their effect
on land and property cost and on incentives to build housing and make improve-
ments in existing structures."' The commission's work in the area of federal
income taxation was based primarily on a research report prepared by Professor
Richard E. Slitor of the University of Massachusetts.'
This Note, drawing pimarily from materials contained in the commission's
reports, will present an analysis of the effect of the federal income tax on housing.
Specifically, the Note will deal with the operation of the federal income tax in
four major areas: (1) the housing consumer; (2) the housing investor; (3) the
rehabilitation and renewal of substandard housing; and (4) the scarcity of
decent low-income housing. The Note will also discuss specific recommendations
for changes in the federal income tax designed to help achieve national housing
goals.0
II. The Housing Consumer
The Internal Revenue Code of 1954 [Code] grants substantial deductions7
1 Housing Act of 1949 § 2, 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1964). This exact language was reaffirmed
in the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968 § 2, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1701t (1969).
2 Everett & Johnston, Foreword, 32 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 187 (1967).
3 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING THE AMERICAN CITY, H.R.
Doc. No. 91-34, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. vii (1969) [hereinafter cited as DOUGLAS REPORT].
4 Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965, § 301(a), 42 U.S.C. § 1456 (Supp. III,
1968).
5 P. HODGE & P. HAUSER, Txa FEDERAL INCOME TAX IN RELATION TO HOUSING i
(1968) [hereinafter cited as HODGE & HAUSER1.
6 Many of the tax reform proposals which will be examined in this Note have been in-
corporated in the tax reform bill of 1969. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969). This bill
was reported out of the House Committee on Ways and Means as this issue was in the final
stages of preparation. Although this was, of course, too late to allow for a detailed examination
of the bill, references to specific sections of H.R. 13270 have been inserted, where appropriate,
in the footnotes.
7 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, §§ 163-64.
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and an exclusion8 to the homeowner and his substantial equivalent.9 On the one
hand, such an individual may, provided he itemizes, deduct from his gross income
the interest that he pays on his mortgage*0 and the taxes that he pays on his
property.' On the other hand, the income that a homeowner would realize
if he rented his residence is not included in the definition of gross income. 2 This
excluded income (called "imputed net rent") is defined as the "gross rental
value minus necessary expenses of homeownership such as mortgage interest,
property taxes, depreciation, repairs and maintenance, and casualty insurance."'"
"A homeowner is an investor who takes his return in the form of services. If he
wishes to do so, he can convert his imputed return to a cash return by moving
and letting his house."' 4 Hence, "[h]omeowners obtain a tax-free return on their
investment and at the same time are allowed to deduct important items of hous-
ing costs .... 15
The tenant pays these same housing costs as a part of his rent but does not
obtain a tax deduction for them.'" The tenant's rent goes to pay a share of the
mortgage cost and the property tax on the building as well as a return to the
owner. The percentage of his rent that is ultimately applied to local property
taxes is particularly notable. Professor Netzer of New York University, in his
study of the property tax for the National Commission on Urban Problems;'"
found that
very large numbers of urban families pay, via their rents, or directly if owner-
occupants, taxes which amount to very sizable increments to their housing
costs. This is shown more directly in [a table 8], which contains a distribu-
tion of housing units in multifamily rental housing subject to property
taxes amounting to a sales tax equivalent of 20 percent or more.' 9
8 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 61; see R. GOODE, THE INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX 120-29
(1964) [hereinafter cited as GOODE].
9 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 216 allows the cooperative tenant-shareholder to deduct his
proportional amount of taxes, interest, and business depreciation. In view of the fact that
homeowners may not deduct depreciation, this section may be said to represent the best of all
possible worlds.
10 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163.
11 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 164.
12 INT. REv. CODE Or 1954, § 61; GOODE 120-29.
13 HODGE & HAUSER 27.
14 GOODE 121.
15 Id. at 122.
16 Id.
17 JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 90TH CONG., 2D SESS., IMPACT OF THE PROPERTY TkK: ITS
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR URBAN PROBLEMS (Comm. Print 1968) [hereinafter cited as
NETZER REPORT].
18 Id. at 18. The substance of the table is set out here.
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN RENTAL
HOUSING SUBJECT TO HIGH PROPERTY TAx RATES, 1960[In thousands]
Real estate tax relative to
rental receipts, stated as a New York Elsewhere in U.S.
sales tax equivalenta City United States Total
33.3 percent or more 541 676 1,217
25 to 33.3 percent 568 513 1,081
20 to 25 percent 293 1,021 1,314
Total, 20 percent or more 1,402 2,210 3,612
I Real estate tax as a percent of rental receipts less real estate tax.
19 Id. at 17.
[Fall, 1969]
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These housing costs, while borne by the tenant, may be deducted by the
landlord" on the theory that the true return from an asset can be determined
only after the cost of maintaining that asset has been deducted."' Put another
way, the landlord must include the returns from his building in his gross income2
and hence is allowed to deduct the costs necessary to maintain the building. This
reasoning, however, cannot be applied to the deductions enjoyed by the home-
owner because of the exclusion of imputed net rent. The homeowner does not
realize any taxable income from his house and therefore his deduction cannot
be classified as costs necessary to maintain an income-producing asset.
The tax deductions which the Code allows the homeowner may be criticized
not only because they fail to meet the traditional justification for the deduction
of costs from income, but also because they give rise to inequities in the tax
treatment of individuals. If the progressive nature of the federal income tax is
socially desirable, then the deductions which the Code bestows on homeowners
are undesirable in that they reduce that progressiveness in two ways. 3 First, those
individuals in the lowest tax brackets, who, are not able to afford a home and
must therefore rent, are placed at a tax disadvantage in comparison to the more
prosperous homeowners. Second, as between persons capable of home owner-
ship, the value of the deductions to the individual varies directly with the amount
that he spends (or is able to spend) on housing. For example, under the rates
effective in 1965 the typical taxpaying homeowner realized tax savings that
offset about twelve percent of his annual housing costs, while the tax savings
at the $50,000 level of income offset about one-third of the housing costs. 24 This
tax saving reduces the higher tax rate that the Code theoretically imposes on
high-income individuals.25
In spite of these considerations, the National Commission on Urban Prob-
lems has endorsed the exclusion of imputed net rent.28 The commission gave
several reasons in support of its position: (1) home ownership encourages social
stability and financial responsibility; (2) ownership encourages better main-
tenance of the structure; (3) ownership helps to eliminate the "alienated tenant"
psychology; and (4) ownership helps to reduce the costs of housing to the in-
dividual." The research report observed that the major criticism of the
exclusion was that it primarily benefited wealthy homeowners, rather than low-
income homeowners. Some dollar limitation on total deductions was recom-
mended to mitigate this "vertical tax differentiation."28  The report then in-
dicated that "[a]ctive programs of encouragement to cooperative housing or
20 INT. REv. CoDE of 1954, § 212.
21 See GOODE 157.
22 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 61(a)(3).
23 DoUGLAs REPORT 400; see also White & White, Horizontal Inequality in the Federal
Income Tax Treatment of Homeowners and Tenants, 18 NAT. TAx J. 225 (1965).
24 GOODE 122.
25 The exclusion of imputed net rent has also been criticized because it does not benefit
those individuals who cannot purchase a home due to noneconomic considerations. This cate-
gory would include people who must move constantly due to their work or who are forced to
live in the central city where homes are not in abundance. See HODGE & HAUSER 109; GODE
120-29; Kindahl, Housing and the Federal Income Tax, 13 NAT. TAX J. 376 (1960).
26 D6uGLAs REPORT 401.
27 Id.
28 HODGE & HAUSER 109.
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condominiums which would provide economical housing for low-income urban
residents would assist in placing homeowner status within their reach."29 As
more individuals are able to attain home ownership through such programs, the
deductions allowed homeowners will become far less objectionable in that a de-
duction for everyone discriminates against no one. Finally, the report pointed
out that "[t]hose below this economic level [the level required for home owner-
ship] commonly incur little or no individual income tax liability by reason of
personal exemptions and standard deduction allowances against their very small
incomes,""0 and hence are not seriously affected by the discrimination in favor of
homeowners.
III. The Housing Investor and the Real Estate Tax Shelter
While the Code's favorable treatment of the homeowner as compared with
the tenant may be justified on sound policy considerations, the advantages
that the housing investor enjoys under the Code are more difficult to rationalize.
By carefully conducting his investment activities and remaining alert to the tax
consequences of every move, the cautious housing investor is currently able to
use devices such as accelerated depreciation3 and the capital gain taxation on
the sale of property" to effectively avoid taxes without risking his capital in
much-needed low-income housing. This ability to avoid taxation without further-
ing any special policy goal constitutes what many writers call the "real estate
tax shelter."
'3
A. Accelerated Depreciation
The owner of "property held for the production of income"3 4 may deduct
from his gross income (1) incidental repair costs; 5 (2) state and local taxes
on the property; 6 (3) interest paid on a mortgage; and (4) depreciation,
defined as "a reasonable allowance for ... exhaustion, [and] wear and tear (in-
cluding a reasonable allowance for obsolescence) .... ,8 The depreciation de-
duction may be applied to "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for
permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any
property or estate." 9 Even if an owner elects to forgo the deduction each year,
he must compute what he was allowed to deduct for purposes of determining
taxable gain on the sale of the property.40 This deduction is provided "to per-
29 Id. at 110.
30 Id.
31 See JOINT PUBLICATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS AND THE SEN-
ATE FINANCE COMM., 9 1ST CONG., IST SESS., TAx REFORM STUDIES AND PROPOSALS U.S.
TREASURY DEPARTMENT 439 (Comm. Print 1969) [hereinafter cited as TAx REFORM STUDIES].
32 See id. at 440.
33 HODGE & HAUSER 36-38.
34 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a) (2).
35 INT. RaV. CODE of 1954, § 212.
36 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 164.
37 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 163.
38 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167(a).
39 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 263(a)(1).
40 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1016(a)(2).
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mit taxpayers to recover through annual deductions the cost (or other basis)
of the property over its useful economic life." 41
The Code specifically mentions three acceptable methods of computing
depreciation for new property: stright line, declining balance not to exceed twice
the straight line rate (200 percent declining balance), and sum-of-the-years-
digits.42 Used property may be depreciated at up to 150 percent declining
balance, or one and one-half times the straight line rate.43 Straight line depreciation
is computed by dividing the cost of the asset less estimated salvage value by the
estimated useful life; the resulting amount may be deducted each taxable year.
The declining balance method is computed by determining the rate allowed and
applying it to the unrecovered basis of the asset (the cost of the asset less the
total amount of depreciation deductions already taken). If, for example, the
straight line rate is 20 percent, the 150 percent declining balance rate would be
30 percent and the 200 percent declining balance rate would be 40 percent.4
Although the estimated salvage value is not considered in this computation, at
no time may an asset be depreciated below its reasonable salvage value.45 The
declining balance methods of depredation are termed "accelerated" because they
provide a deduction in-excess of the straight line method during the early years
of an asset's useful life. "
The economic advantages of accelerated depreciation are accentuated by
the equity owner's ability to base his deduction on the total cost of the asset while
most of that cost is financed by a mortgage - a procedure commonly called
leveraging. Unlike most other deductions allowed by the Code, the depredation
deduction does not represent an out-of-pocket expense in the year in which it is
taken. Thus, although the owner cannot deduct the principal payments that
he makes on his mortgage, accelerated depreciation deductions allow him to
protect income from which to make those payments. As the Treasury Depart-
ment has stated,
accelerated depreciation allowances in the early years exceeds by far the
relatively low element of principal repayment in the mortgage service.
Consequently, depredation deductions, and particularly those in excess of
any current actual loss of the property's value, serve to provide a tax-
exemption cover for cash flow, enabling the cash flow to be withdrawn
by the investor without being subject to individual income tax.48
Moreover, if the accelerated depreciation deduction is large enough, it may
not only protect income from the asset, but also shelter other sources of income
from taxation. "
41 Rev. Proc. 62-21, 1962-2 Cum. BULL. 418, 429. This procedure contains the useful
life guidelines which are now in effect.
42 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167(b) (1)-(3). For an explanation of sum-of-the-years-digits,
see Hoo o & HAusnR 14.
43 Rev. Rul. 57-352, 1957-2 Gum. BULL. 150. However, because of the shorter useful life
which the owner of used property may claim for his property, his depreciation deduction may
in effect be as beneficial as that of the original owner. TAx REFORM STmxas 440.
44 See A. CERF, REAL ESTATE AND THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 128-54 (1965).
45 Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-1(a) (1956).
46 See A. CERF, supra note 44, at 128.
47 HoDGE & HAUSER 15.
48 TAX RmFoR. STuDmas 440 n.i.
49 Id. at 440.
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As an illustration, assume that an apartment house with a fifty-year useful
life costs $1,000,000 to construct. The depreciation deductions which might be
taken by the owner for the first year of the building's life would vary widely
according to the method of depreciation employed. This is illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1
COMPUTATION OF DEPRECIATION
Method of Depreciation Computation Deduction
Straight Line $1,000,000 $20,00050
150 Percent Declining $1,000,000
Balance 50 X 1.5 $30,000
200 Percent Declining $1,000,000Baane 0 X 2 $40,000Balance 50
Assume further that the apartment building is financed by an $800,000 mortgage
at six percent interest, due in twenty years. If the owner's net income from the
building were $80,000 in the first year, taxable income, without allowance for
property tax deductions, would be as reflected in Table 2.
TABLE 2
EFFECT OF ACCELERATED DEPRECIATION ON TAx LIAILr
150 Percent 200 Percent
Straight Declining Declining
Line Balance Balance
Net Income: $80,000 $80,000 $80,000
Less:
Mortgage Interest 48,000 48,000 48,000
Depreciation 20,000 68,000 30,000 78,000 40,000 88,000
Taxable Income
(or Loss) $12,000 $2,000 ($8,000)
As the table shows, the investor computing depreciation with the 200 percent
declining balance method has realized $80,000 net income on his investment of
$200,000, while at the same time obtaining a tax loss of $8,000.
From a historical viewpoint, this accelerated depreciation device is difficult
to justify. The provision, originally enacted in 1954, appears to have been
directed primarily at industrial machinery and equipment.5" A recent study of
the relative merits of accelerated depreciation, assembled by the staff of the Joint
Economic Committee in 1964, places most of its emphasis on machinery and
equipment.51 In fact, the Treasury Department has stated that "[n]o conscious
50 Id. at 445.
51 STAFF FOR THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMM., 88TH CONG., 2D SEss., THE FEDERAL TAX
SYSTEM: FACTS AND PROBLEMS 95-104 (Comm. Print. 1964) [hereinafter cited as FEDERAL
TAX SYSTEM REPORT].
[Fall, 1969]
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decision was made to adopt the present system as a useful device to stimulate
building or to provide us with more or better housing, let alone lower income
housing. The present tax system for buildings just happened. 52
Congress temporarily suspended the use of accelerated depreciation, along
with the seven percent investment credit, in 1966.. s As the committee hearings
indicated, however, the primary purpose of this suspension was to slow down the
economy in order to ease inflationary pressure.5" When the hearings to consider
restoration of accelerated depreciation and the investment credit were held,
practically none of the discussion concerned accelerated depreciation." Thus,
although some might wish to interpret the reinstatement of accelerated deprecia-
tion as positive congressional approval of this device, the record indicates that
this was not the case. A move to abolish accelerated depreciation would only
have confused the primary issue under consideration, which was again control
of inflation."- This was indicated by Secretary of the Treasury Fowler's response
to a committee question concerning a tax reform rider to the restoration bill:
We are not in any position to delineate the agenda for tax reform as a
preliminary consideration to the enactment of the bill pending before this
committee. We need, I need personally a very great deal of study and
effort and I am sure Mr. Surrey [Assistant Secretary of the Treasury] and
the staff do as well.57
B. Capital Gains
To the housing investor, the economic advantages of accelerated depreciation
are further enhanced by the tax treatment of any capital gain realized on the sale
of his asset.5" For when the owner sells his property, the difference between the
adjusted basis of the property (cost less accumulated depreciation) and the sale
price will be taxed at capital gain rates." Capital gain rates are, of course, lower
than ordinary income rates, on the theory that capital appreciation occurring
over a period of several years should be taxed at a rate below the rates applied
to income realized on a yearly basis."0 Consequently, "[t]he maximum tax that
can be paid on the excess of long-term capital gain over net short-term capital
loss is 25 percent and it may be less." 1
For those who use accelerated depreciation, an early sale of the asset is
quite beneficial because part of the recognized gain represents prior over-
52 TAx REFOR STUDIES 445-46.
53 The original suspension was to be effective from October 10, 1966 to December 31,
1967. Act of November 8, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-800, § 2, 80 Stat. 1513. This period was later
shortened, however, to March 9, 1967. INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 167(i).
54 Hearings on H.R. 17607 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess., at 1 (1966) [hereinafter cited as 1966 House Hearings] and Hearings on H.R. 17607
Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 5 (1966) [hereinafter cited as
1966 Senate Hearings].
55 Hearings on H.R. 6950 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967).
56 Id. at 3 (testimony of Secretary of the Treasury Fowler).
57 Id. at 47.
58 HODGE & HAUSER 139-41.
59 INT. Rnv. CODE of 1954, § 1231.
60 FEDERAL TAx SYSTEm REPORT 67.
61 See A. CERF, supra note 44, at 70.
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depreciation rather than capital appreciation. To reap the maximum benefit,
the property must be sold when the accelerated depreciation deduction becomes
equal to the amount which would be deductible under the straight line method.2
If the asset is held beyond this time, much income will be exposed to ordinary
tax rates. For purposes of illustration, Table 3 presents the amount of deprecia-
tion that an investor might deduct on a $1,000,000 building over the first twenty
years of its fifty-yeax useful life.
TABLE 3
ANNUAL DEPRECIATION OF $1,000,000 BUILDING
200 Percent 200 Percent
Straight Declining Straight Declining
Line Balance Line Balance
Year Deduction Deduction Year Deduction Deduction
1 $20,000 $40,000 11 $20,000 $26,594
2 $20,000 $38,400 12 $20,000 $25,530
3 $20,000 $36,864 13 $20,000 $24,508
4 $20,000 $35,390 14 $20,000 $23,536
5 $20,000 $33,974 15 $20,000 $22,586
6 $20,000 $32,614 16 $20,000 $21,684
7 $20,000 $31,310 17 $20,000 $20,816
8 $20,000 $30,058 18 $20,000 $19,984
9 $20,000 $28,856 19 $20,000 $19,184
10 $20,000 $27,702 20 $20,000 $18,416
As the table clearly shows, the accelerated depreciation deduction finally falls
below the amount deductible under the straight line method after seventeen
years. By that time accelerated depreciation has provided $160,422 more in
deductions than the straight line method. Sale of the asset at this point would
allow the owner to realize that much more at capital gain, rather than ordinary
income, rates of taxation. The effect of this procedure is to permit capital gain
taxation on what would otherwise have been ordinary income.63 This ability
to take accelerated depreciation and to reap capital gain on an early sale has
been largely responsible for the "frequent turnover and instability of tenure"'"
that exists in the housing market today.
As an illustration, assume that the building used in the previous example
is sold after ten years for $1,200,000.5 The difference in the gain on the sale,
depending upon which method of depreciation is used, is indicated in Table 4.
62 HoDo & HAUSER 118-19.
63 Id. at 15; TAX REFORM STUDIES at 440.
64 HODGE & HAUsER 38. Contra, G. STERNLrEB, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 102 (1966).
65 In the strong real estate markets which have prevailed during the post-World War
II period, the value may not decline at all and may indeed rise well above the original
cost in spite of the underlying forces, partially offset by deductible repair and main-
tenance expense, causing gradual physical and economic depreciation of the building.
HODGE & HAUSER 119.
[Fal, 1969]
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TABLE 4
CAPrrAL GAiN REALIzED ON SALE
Straight
Line
200 Percent
Declining
Balance
Cost $1,000,000 $1,000,000
Less: Total Depreciation 200,000 335,168
Adjusted Basis $ 800,000 $ 664,832
Sale Price $1,200,000 $1,200,000
Less: Adjusted Basis 800,000 664,832
Capital Gain $ 400,000 $ 535,168
The owner using accelerated depredation in this illustration has, up to the
point of sale, exposed less income to taxation because he has taken larger annual
depreciation deductions. Had both owners retained their properties for a full
fifty years, the total deductions taken by each would be equal. However, an
early sale allows the user of accelerated depreciation to divest himself of the
property before the equalization can occur. He must recognize more gain on the
sale, but that gain is taxed at the advantageous capital gain rates. Hence, he
has employed his deduction to shelter ordinary income and then recognized
that income when capital gain rates apply.
C. Recapture
In order to prevent the wholesale conversion of ordinary income into capital
gain, Congress in 1964 adopted the recapture rules now set forth in section
1250 of the Code." Recapture is simply the taxation of capital gains at rates
applicable to ordinary income. For depreciation taken on property held for a
period of less than 12 months after 1963, the section provides for total recapture
- application of ordinary income tax rates to all gains reflecting depreciation
taken since 1963. For a holding period between 12 and 20 months, the section
recaptures all depreciation deducted since 1963 in excess of the amount de-
ductible under the straight line method. For a holding period of more than
20 but less than 120 months, the section recaptures a percentage of the depre-
ciation taken since 1963 in excess of straight line equal to 100 percent less I
percent for each month the property is held over 20 months." Thus, the owner
need only hold his property for 120 months (ten years) to completely avoid
recapture.
The ineffectiveness of the recapture provisions may be illustrated by the ex-
ample used in Table 3, where the annual 200 percent declining balance deductions
did not fall below straight line deductions until the asset had been held seventeen
66 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 1250.
67 HODGE & HAUSER 123.
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years. By that time, the declining balance method had provided $160,422 in excess
deductions. These considerations have led to suggestions that all depreciation
in excess of straight line be recaptured.18 Certainly the present provisions, as
one commentator has noted, "should not discourage any taxpayer from taking
accelerated depreciation." 9
D. Reform
The cost of these tax advantages to the federal government, at 1967 tax
and economic levels, is conservatively estimated by the Treasury Department
to be some $750 million due to accelerated depreciation and $100 million due
to capital gain treatment of sales.70 Of this $750 million, only an estimated $50
million went "directly into the process of rewarding investors who currently
or recently have made commitments increasing the low- and moderate-income
housing supply.""' One reason for this lack of interest in low- and moderate-
income housing is that the tax advantages operate best where high leveraging,
assured high income, and the prospects of capital gain in excess of overde-
preciation are available. Investments like motels, luxury high-rise apartments,
and shopping centers are most likely to meet these requirements. "Tax shelter
operators on the grand scale do not find the low-income rental project at-
tractive.
72
The effects of these tax concessions on certain individual taxpayers are
even more striking. The Code, for all its defects, has achieved acceptance as
the "fairest of all taxes" largely because of the popular conviction that it "accords
best with the ability to pay."7 " The high rate of federal taxation does draw
complaints, but the ability of some people to legally avoid all taxation threatens
the viability of the tax to a much greater degree." The Treasury Department's
examination of a sample of tax returns from taxpayers engaged in real estate
operations showed that
out of one group of 13 individual returns for the year 1966 depreciation
losses reduced the Federal tax liability of nine of them to zero and of two
others to less than $25. In the aggregate, the 13 taxpayers studied - all
of whom had substantial gross incomes - reported capital gains on real
estate of $1,260,000, depreciation deductions of $462,000, and net rental
losses of $370,000 after deducting all expenses and depreciation.75
68 This suggestion has been embodied in the tax reform bill of 1969. H.R. 13270, 91st
Cong., 1st Sess. § 521(b) (1969). The bill provides that "when depreciable real property
is sold after July 24, 1969, accelerated depreciation taken after July 24, 1969, in excess of
allowable straight-line depreciation is to be recaptured as ordinary income to the extent of the
gain occurring upon the sale." H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91sT CONG., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 167
(1969). Nevertheless, even 100 percent recapture cannot entirely offset the effect of the excess
annual deduction. For recapture cannot operate until there is a sale, while the prior deductions
have a "present value" in excess of their dollar amount.
69 Horvitz, Sections 1250 and 1245: The Puddle and the Lake, 20 TAx L. REv. 285, 442(1965).
70 TAx REFORM STUDiES at 439.
71 Id. at 442.
72 HODGE & HAUSER 32.
73 GOODE 11.
74 See NEWSWEEiK, Feb. 24, 1969, at 65; TimE, April 4, 1969, at 84.
75 TAx REFORM STUDIES 443-44.
[Fall, 1969]
The realization that some individuals may use these various devices to legally
avoid all taxation has led to recommendatibns for a minimum income tax. Such
a proposal was originally developed by the Treasury Department during Presi-
dent Johnson's administration."6 The depaktment pointed out that: "
Whatever may be the merits of each of theqt tax preferences, of overrid-
ing importance is the principle that every individual with substantial income
should pay a minimum tax toward the'cost of Government that in itself
bears a relationship to the income involved.77
The Nixon administration originally expressed disapproval of this proposal,78
but later decided to endorse it."9
The real estate tax shelter could be readily eliminatdd by requiring that
property held for use as rental housing be depireciated at the straight line rate
only. 0 Such a reform would remove the incentive for quick property turnovers
and induce owners to better maintain their property in order to protect its long-
term income-producing potential. -
The permanent abandonment of accelerated depreciation would probably
be opposed with arguments similar to those urged against its suspension in 1966.82
The major problems of the housing industry, as recognized by the president of
the National Association of Homebuilders during the 1966 hearings, "have been
the extremely tight credit picture, rising interest rates, and the diversion of funds
from homebuilding into other areas of investment."8 " Proponents of accelerated
depreciation would be able to show that rental and homeowner vacancy rates
have fallen since 1966,"' and that abolition might cause a rise in rents as well
as a withdrawal of millions of dollars from the mortgage market."8
'While these objections are not without force, the fact remains that the
76 Id. at 13-14.
77 Id.
78 N.Y. Times, March 20, 1969, at 23, col. 1.
79 N.Y. Times, April 23, 1969, at 32, col. 1.
80 Although this was one of the reforms recommended to the National Commission on
Urban Problems by Hodge and Hauser, the commission declined to either approve or disapprove
it. Compare HoDGE & HAUSER 104 with DOUGLAS REPORT-405,-6., A modified version of
the proposal has been embodied in the tax reform bill of 1969. H.R& 13270, 91st.Cong., 1st
Sess. § 521(a) (1969).
Under the'bill, new construction (other than new residential housing) will no
longer be eligible for the double declining balance method of depreciation or the sum
of the years-digits method unless (1) the' construction of the building began before
July 25, 1969, or (2) a written binding contract with respect to any part of the con-
struction or for permanent financing was entered into before July 25, 1969. Other
new construction will be limited to 150-percent declining balance, in the same manner
as used property is limited under present law.
H.R. REP. No. 91-413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 166 (1969). The bill also provides that
in the case of used buildings acquired after July 24, 1969, only straight line depreciation may
be taken. Id. at 166-67.
81 See HoDGE & HAUSER 36-38, 104; TAx REvoRm STUDIES 449.
82 See, e.g., 1966 Senate Hearings 304-7 (testimony of Larry Blackmon, president of, the
National Association of Home Builders).
83 1966 House Hearings 253.
84 BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, HOUSING VACANCIES 19 U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Series H-
111, No. 55, 1969).
85 1966 House Hearings 260-61 (testimony of Peter H. Edwards). -Mr. Edwards argued
that loss of accelerated depreciation would reduce the rate of return on investment in housing.
Such reduction, he concluded, would force lenders to withdraw -funds from the mortgage
market in order to invest in more profitable ventures. Id.
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present "remedy" (i.e., accelerated depreciation) is both inadequate and in-
equitable. Accelerated depreciation is inadequate from a social viewpoint be-
cause it fails to foster investment in low-income housing; it is inadequate from
an economic viewpoint because it does not strike at the core problem which
housing investors face. The real problem - the high cost of money - cannot
be solved by tax concessions. Finally, accelerated depreciation is inequitable
simply because it allows some individuals to avoid altogether their share of
governmental costs.
IV. Substandard Housing
The beneficial Code treatment of investors involved in housing construction
can be contrasted with the adverse effect which the Code has on other investors
who rehabilitate or demolish substandard housing. In a recent study of, slum
housing in Newark, New Jersey, Professor George Sternlieb, of Rutgers Uni-
versity, found that such slum investors are engaged in a "relatively specialized
occupation. The investor in this type of property typically is iot party to other
areas of real estate investment."8 (Italics in original omitted.) As a rule, such
investors evidence little concern for their parcels, resulting in progressive de-
terioration.8 7 This apathy has been caused, at least in part, by the structure
of the present Internal Revenue Code.
A. Rehabilitation
The Code's requirement that substantial capital outlays for maintenance
be depreciated over the useful life of the improvement s' causes several tax prob-
lems that are particularly burdensome for the owner of substandard housing:
(1) the depreciation deduction will usually not be responsive to the slum owner's
special situation in that the actual life span of slum-located improvements may
be considerably shorter than the "useful life" over which they may be de-
preciated;"0 (2) the improvements rarely command appreciable return in the
form of capital gains; and (3) the present recapture rules will run separately
on the repairs, requiring a longer holding period to avoid recapture." Thus,
"the possible tax and other disadvantages of substantial maintenance expenditures
on older properties have reinforced the underlying economic forces which create
and perpetuate substandard housing concentrations."'" Moreover, these dis-
advantages are not balanced by any tax incentive, since the owner may deduct
depreciation on the building without making any repairs at all.9"
Two specific recommendations for changes in the tax law to aid in slum
86 G. STERNLiER, THE TENEMENT LANDLORD 124 (1966).
87 Id. at 124-28.
88 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 263(a) (1).
89 If occupants use the property roughly, the effect of conventional repair and
maintenance such as redecorating or even improvements such as new kitchen or
plumbing fixtures may be evanescent and have to be repeated quickly with no net
economic gain. HODGE & HAUSER 39.
90 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 1250(f) (3) (4).
91 HODGE & HAUSER 5.
92 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 167.
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rehabilitation merit discussion. The first would amend the Code to allow a
reasonable amount spent on rehabilitation of substandard housing" to be de-
ducted as a current expense.9 4 Instead of being forced to capitalize the amount
spent to rehabilitate his building,: the landlord would be able to write off the
cost against his income as a current expense. Hence, he' could recover part of
the cost of- repairs immediately instead of waiting several years to recover it
through depreciation deductions. This change would recognize that most of the
essential maintenance work on substandard housing represents an accumulation
of neglected ordinary repairs and that such work usually causes little capital
appreciation.9" The change would also further one of the goals of the Housing
Act of 1964,96 in which Congress "recognized that conservation and rehabilita-
tion, including [housing] code enforcement, 'must be stressed if the total urban
renewal program is to be a success." 9 7
The second proposed amendment to 'the Code designed to foster rehabilita-
tion would deny the depreciation deduction to housing which does not conform
to local housing code standards9 8 Most major, cities have adopted such codes
to aid in the struggle against urban blight, but enforcement has proven difficult.9
The proposed amendment is designed to aid local enforcement of these codes
by taxing the unheeding slumlord out of business.100 The advocates of this pro-
posal argue, inter alia, that tax deductions ought not be givei for illegal ac-
tivity." ' Unfortunately, administrative problems and probable ineffectiveness
militate against such a reform. If enforcement required local certificatior, of
housing (which is quite likely), the rules might lead to harsh results, such as the
loss of certification' for a minor code violation. This could invite corruption. The
predictable decline in property values that loss of the ability to deduct deprecia-
tion would cause could force rent increases or wipe out the equities of many
owners. The end result would probably be the disappearance of the remaining'
concerned slum landlords.0 2 As one authority has concluded,
[l]ooking at the whole approach from what might reasonably be expected
to be the Federal tax policy standpoint, the denial of tax depreciation would
seem merely to shift to the Federal tax system and its depreciation rules
in particular much of the burden of enforcing penalties for noncompliance
with local housing codes1 0 3
93 Hodge & Hauser recommend that structures be'at least' Ahrty years old to qualify as
"substandard" in this context and that dollar limitations per dwelling unit be enacted to pre-
vent luxury apartment owners from abusing this amendment. HoxE & HAUSER 106.
94 See HoDGB & HAusER 60-68; DouGLAs REPORT 406. A modified version of this proposal
has been embodied in the tax reform bill of 1969. H.R. 13270, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. § 521(a)
(1969). The bill would allow a taxpayer who meets certain requirements to write off within
five years expenditures made on rehabilitating substandard housing. See H.. REP. No. 91-
413, 91ST CONG., 1ST SEss. pt. 1, at 167 (1969).
95 HonoE & HAusER 34.
96 Housing Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-560, 78 Stat. 769 (codified in scattered sections of
12, 15, 20, 38, 40, 42 U.S.C.).
97 Comment, Conservation and Rehabilitation of Housing: An Idea Approaches Adoles-
cence, 63 Miox. L. Rxv. 892, 911 (1965).
98 Honoa & HAUSER 68-74.
99 Note, Municipal Housing Codes, 69 HAxv. L. Rav. 1115, 1123-26 (1956).
100 HODGE & HAUSEpR 69.
101 Id. at 73.
102 Id. at 74.
103 Id. at 72.
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B. Renewal
Any Code amendment to foster rehabilitation by allowing the deduction of
substantial maintenance expenses might well be accompanied by a change to
foster demolition of substandard housing. Treasury regulations require the in-
vestor who purchases property with the intent of razing it to add the cost of
demolition to the value of the land."'4 Since land is not a depreciable asset,""5
the investor cannot write off the cost of demolition. If, on the other hand, an
investor's building loses its usefulness and is abandoned, a retirement loss is
allowed for income tax purposes.'
The net effect of the capitalization or deferred write-off of unrecovered
capital costs on old buildings plus any additional net costs of tearing them
down in situations where intent or contractual agreement indicate that the
land is worth more in the new use cleared than with the old building on it
is to give pause to demolition or to drive investors into a carefully planned
sequence of transactions to obtain the most favorable tax results, if the
demolition losses and costs are significant. 0 7
The "carefully planned sequence of transactions" refers to the activities of an
investor who will use a slum building for a few years rather than indicate his
intention to demolish. Such a subterfuge enables him to claim the abandonment
loss mentioned above, for it is often difficult, if not impossible, to prove that his
original intention was otherwise.
The need to resort to such devices would be removed if present treasury
regulations were amended to allow an investor to include the cost of razing sub-
standard housing in the total cost of the new housing unit for depredation pur-
poses. The investor would then be able to recover the cost of demolition during
the useful life of the new structure, instead of being forced to wait until the
asset is sold.
V. Tax Incentives
The fundamental difficulty with low- and moderate-income housing as an
investment is that it does not pay a competitive rate of return. Faced with con-
stantly rising construction costs and high interest rates, the real estate industry
cannot finance housing for near-poverty-level tenants without governmental
aid. 8 Spokesmen for President Nixon's administration have urged a program
of tax incentives to meet this problem."' Such incentives are favored because:
(1) business is more amenable to programs which dispense with bureaucratic
control; (2) incentives have been effectively used in the past; (3) incentives
are stable (a result of congressional reluctance to amend the Code), and this
104 Treas. Reg. § 1.165-3(a)(1) (1960).
105 HoDGE & HAUSER 13.
106 Id. at 136.
107 Id. at 138.
108 See, e.g., Hearings on S. 2100 Before the Senate Finance Comm., 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
314 (1967) (testimony of Edward P. Eichler) [hereinafter cited as 1967 Senate Hearings].
109 N.Y. Times, March 20, 1969, at 1, col. 4.
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aids long-term planning; and (4) congressional approval is, traditionally, rel-
atively easy to obtain for tax incentives."'0
On the other hand, tax incentives have been criticized on several grounds.
The initial difficulty is that incentives erode the tax base by excluding a source of
income from taxation.' They therefore necessitate a rise in the general rate
of taxation to obtain the revenue lost. Certainly, if incentives were the most
efficient method of attaining the desired goal, this general rise would be less than
the rise needed to fund a spending program designed to achieve the same goal.
However, by their very nature, such tax incentives are difficult to study on a
yearly basis. Studying numerous tax returns to analyze the effectiveness of in-
centives is both costly and cumbersome." 2 Another difficulty with incentives is
that they could create serious tax inequity, for incentives may bring unintended
benefits to those investors who are able to use them as "loopholes" in the law.
Yet if the law is so specific as to avoid the possibility of abuse, it may contain
the type of bureaucratic control which the incentive is designed to avoid.""
Moreover, many congressional observers feel that Congress now recognizes that
tax incentives represent an expense just as a subsidy does and hence will be just
as careful in its consideration of any incentive program." 4
Both the Treasury Department (during President Johnson's administra-
tion)" and the National Commission on Urban Problems" 6 have opposed plac-
ing primary reliance on tax incentives. The commission stated that "govern-
mental efforts to encourage the construction and rehabilitation of housing for
low- and moderate-income families should rely primarily upon direct subsidy
programs .... ",, This would assure that all governmental efforts to aid housing
would be controlled by one specialized agency rather than being divided between
a specialized housing agency and the Treasury Department. Direct negotiations
with business would assure that all interested parties would be given a chance
to participate, instead of only those who could take advantage of tax incentives."'
As with accelerated depreciation, the chief argument against tax incentives
is that the federal income tax is not equipped to effectively combat the housing
problem. The Code, primarily designed to collect revenue, should exclude no
source of income from coverage unless the exclusion can clearly be shown to be
the most efficient means available to achieve an important social or economic
goal."' A decent home for every American family is an important social and
economic goal; tax incentives simply do not appear to be the best means of
achieving that goal.
110 Honoa & HAUSER 97-98.
111 Id. at 87.
112 Id.
113 Id.114 Id. "at 96, 99.
115 Id. at 89-96. 1967 Senaate Hearings 140-60 (testimony of Joseph W. Barr, Undersecre-
tary of the Treasury).
116 DouolAs REPORT 405.
117 Id.
118 Hono. & HAuSER 99.
119 GOODE 99-100.
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VI. Conclusion
Tax reform in relation to housing should be enacted by the Ninety-first
Congress."' Elimination of accelerated depreciation would help to effectuate
overall housing policy goals and would make the tax laws more equitable. Such
an amendment would remove much of the incentive for qulick turnovers in the
housing market, and would thereby encourage adequate maintenance of housing.
The federal income tax would be more equitable in that investors would neither
be able to shelter income behind overdepreciation nor to convert ordinary in-
come into capital gain.'- Amendments to allow the deduction as a current
expense of substantial capital outlays for maintenance of substandard housing"
and to allow depreciation of demolition costs in housing renewal would also
help to counteract the deterioration of our housing supply.
Nevertheless, the major governmental effort to provide low- and moderate-
income housing should rest primarily on a program of direct subsidies. The pri-
mary consideration here is the inability to effectively evaluate the efficiency of
tax incentives. Given the social advantages of home ownership, any govern-
mental effort should be directed, at least in part, toward constructing.cooperative
low-income housing. Home ownership would provide low-income families with
a stake in community development, which in turn aids community stability.
An intelligent tax policy can, at best, only assist a broader governmental pro-
gram to alleviate the current housing problem.
Sean T. Crimmins
120 See note 6, supra.
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122 See note 94, supra.
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